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Editorial Comment

This comment is offered as a brief and imperfect restatement of some
of the Thomistic philosophical thought, and some few historical facts,
which are necessary premises to a discussion of our late Holy Father's
legacy to the juridical world order. Such a discussion is the symposium
presented in this issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.
The juridical world order actually exists.
Man is by nature social. There is in human nature a tendency, which
may be called sociability, urging each man to associate with other men,
and that tendency has for one of its purposes the well-being of the
society of all men. That society is the necessary milieu of individual
human existence and individual human perfection. Yet, to say that man
is social, inclined by nature to enter society, is to state less than the
whole truth. It needs to be said, not only that man is social, but that
he is a socius - by the very fact that he exists, every man is an associate in the human society.
Societies exist where there are bonds of duty between men, which
bonds serve goods or purposes common to the group comprising all
men affected by those bonds. Such a society is juridical when the duties
which bind its members together are not merely moral obligations, but
justly coercible ones. A duty whose external performance, even when
done involuntarily, contributes justly to the well-being of a society, can
be socially coercible. It is socially coercible when men, as members of
that society, enjoy a moral right to use force or the threat of force to
compel the performance or forbearance which the duty demands of those
it obliges. When the right thus to use force derives from natural law,
the society is a juridical society of natural law.

Every man has, by natural law, a right to use force to obtain certain
performances and forbearances from any other man. The enforcibility
of these duties is necessary, not only to the individual who enforces them
to protect his life, or his physical, mental or moral integrity; it is necessary to the essential functioning of the general human society as the
milieu in which the creating God places men and destines them to
achieve perfection. There are instances in which a man is bound to use
force or the threat of force in behalf of other persons, and instances in
which he has not only a right but a duty to exercise forcible self-help
or self-defense, in order to preserve the "inalienable" rights. Some of
these rights are "inalienable" because they serve the broad family of
human kind and cannot, therefore, be surrendered by their individual
tenant with moral impunity.
The juridical world order exists, not only in virtue of natural law
as has been said above, but in virtue also of positive law.
The imperium of natural law proceeds from the intellect and will of
God, creating men and the human society. The command which makes
positive law is the product of a human lawmaker's mind and will, exercising a free and rational choice to determine that certain duties, not
imposed by the juridical order effected by natural law in the society of
human kind, shall bind men coercibly in that general society or in one
of the particular societies of men. These last are the societies established
by groups of men whose geographical and other propinquities warrant
their establishing peculiar and particular societies within the general
society of the human race.
These are the national societies or states which, because their functions of making and enforcing positive law are quite obvious, have
dominated the history of human social life. So thorough has this domination been in fact, that some philosophers and jurists - not all of them
Austinians or Hegelians - have identified the state or nation with human
society itself, or at least have ascribed to no other society than the states
or nations the character of a positive juridical social order. The effect
of Austin's image of "the sovereign," to blind many of our ancestors
and contemporaries to the existence of the positive juridical world order
created by common human consent, usually expressed in treaties, and
enforcible under the laws of war, is a commonplace.
The legacy of Pius XII is two-fold.
He recalled clearly the teaching of the perennial philosophy on the
natural juridical character of the human society, and on the bases which
found the positive juridical order expressed in the jus inter gentes.

He urged and implored the men of our time to cast that positive
juridical order which serves the natural society of all men and all nations
into new forms which might shine with at least some of the just splendor
of the universal kingdom of which Dante dreamed. But the Pope was
no dreamer, and his legacy is not given to some future millenium of
perfect men and perfect human institutions. His testament contemplates
that the institutions, such as the United Nations Organization, which
presently and actually serve the positive juridical world order, albeit imperfectly, shall be taken as the existential basis of a realistically constructed and philosophically inspired fabric that may adequately serve
humanity's need for a common public justice in our time.
THE CATHOLIC LAWYER is honored to bring to its readers the distinguished essays in which Bishop Griffiths, Father Drinan, Mr. Mahony
and Mr. O'Brien trace and develop the precious threads of the Pope's
legacy of thought. These papers were first presented in the October
1959 meeting of the Catholic Association for International Peace, at
Washington, D. C.
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